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I. Introduction 
t has been known for a long time that in Computer 
World surveillance, defense uses a flawed hypothesis 
because it leads to a strategy based on tweaking and 
"fixing the comprehending" with no long term vision. 
When new forms of attacks appear, ad hoc response 
are put together, which often involves making the use of 
the internet more cumbrous, by adding layers of 
authentication. "Defensive measures tend to involve 
complicating protocols or their implementation, making 
things more secure by making them more cumbersome 
a mentioning abstaining from using some functionality, 
as more often than not each new functionality provides 
new points of entry for malicious activities [1],[2],[3],[4]. 
But the introductions of new functionalities are precisely 
what make the internet so attractive and successful. 
Furthermore there is still no tolerable defence  to zero 
day attack, as anomaly based detection has still some 
open problems, like the false positive probability. An 
ideal   cyber- defense  would  provide  full  protection  to 
users,  while  preserving  all  the  functionalities.  We  are 
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very far from this situation. But there is no reason why in 
the long run, we could not get close to such a situation. 
One thing that cyber-defense can do and 
should is to be more intelligent. The approach to 
defense based on" fixing the plumbing" is inherently 
suboptimal. A massive paradigm shift is needed, the 
kind of paradigm shift that makes a much heavier use of 
Artificial Intelligence (AI). The idea or making heavier use 
of AI in Computer World surveillance is not new. In an 
editorial in IEEE security and Privacy [5], Carl Landwehr 
stated that "In their early days, computer security and 
artificial intelligence didn’t  seem to have much to say to 
each other. AI researchers were interested in making 
computers do things that only humans had been able to 
do, while security researchers aimed to fix the leaks in 
the plumbing of the computing infrastructure or design 
infrastructures they deemed leak proof." But the dream 
of retroactively make the internet secure and leak-proof, 
is clearly not a clever approach.  
The introduction of new technologies like the 
proliferation of new web applications or the increasing 
use of wireless, have exacerbated this fact [1]. 
Computer World surveillance, has become the most 
complex threat to society. Despite years of incremental 
improvements in cyber-defense, it is clear that a 
paradigm shift is needed, but at the same time difficult 
to imagine. 
This is even more true for web-application 
security and the need for AI is even more obvious and 
urgent there. Against web application attacks, such as 
Cross Site Scripting (XSS), Cross Site Request Forgery 
(CSRF), injection code, the present approach consists 
in introducing rules supposed to prevent them. This is 
the same kind of logic that un derived the idea of same 
origin policy. Over the years XSS and CSRF began to 
mean a variety of attacks. Some of them can be 
construed as direct circumvention of the same origin 
policy. Same origin   policy looked like a simple and 
efficient protection. 
It turned out that it could be circumvented 
reasonably easily and was preventing some functionality 
to modern websites. In the words of D. Crockford same 
origin policy (which is adopted by most browsers) 
"prevents useful things and allows dangerous ones" [7]). 
Today, this policy is being revisited. For example, cross-
site access control [8] is an attempt to refine the security 
policy in such a way that one can get the benefit of 
cross site access without the security implications. 
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In the same way, SQL injection codes were 
described as "extremely easy to avoid" [9]. Still recently 
MYSQL and Oracle, both suffered such attacks. What 
may be construed as mistakes is also reflection of the 
fact that those mistakes are not so easy to avoid in the 
increasingly complicated world of web applications. To 
detect web application attacks such as XSS, CSRF or 
injection codes requires more than simple rules, but the 
ability to some form of context dependent reasoning. 
Despite some work done in the past, AI does not play 
central role in Computer World surveillance today and 
Computer World surveillance has not been an area of 
development of AI as intensely pursued as robots, 
machine learning and the like. Typically, the use of AI in 
Computer World surveillance has consisted in using 
some tools developed in AI and apply them to intrusion 
detection or other aspects of Computer World 
surveillance. The approach consisting in importing some 
AI techniques developed in totally different areas and try 
to apply them to Computer World surveillance, may work 
in a few cases, but has inherent and severe limitations. 
AI has been developed and is organized around specific 
applications, many of them (AI is a large field). 
Computer World surveillance has specific needs and to 
be a long term contributor to Computer World 
surveillance, new AI techniques will have to be 
developed specifically. 
Obviously AI has made a lot of 
accomplishments and there is a lot to be learned 
relevant for Computer World surveillance and many new 
techniques suited for Computer World surveillance 
could be inspired from existing ones in AI. In a sense 
this has happened already. As observed by C. Landwehr 
[5]: "A branch of AI that has been connected with 
computer security from relatively early days is 
automated reasoning, particularly as applied to 
programs and systems. [...] Although it wasn’t identified 
as AI at the time, Dan Farmer and Wietse Venema’s 
SATAN program, released in 1995, automated a process 
for finding vulnerabilities in system configurations that 
had previously required much more human effort." S. 
Forrest [10] has proposed a system of inductive 
reasoning, which belongs to the realm of AI. And one 
can interpret the work of the group of Vigna et al in 
UCSB [11], [12], [13], [14], [15]) as proceeding from a 
somewhat similar philosophy. Arguably Web application 
firewalls (WAFs) or more generally firewalls using deep 
packet inspections can be construed as a kind of 
instantiation of AI in security. Firewalls have been part of 
the arsenal of cyber-defense for many years. Although 
more sophisticated techniques are also used, in most 
cases the filtering is based on port numbers. WAFs 
cannot rely on port number as most web applications 
use the same port as the rest of the web traffic. Deep 
packet inspection is the only option for WAFs to be able 
to tell a malicious application from a legitimate one. The 
idea of filtering at the application layer was introduced 
already in the third generation of firewalls in the 1990’s. 
WAFs can be construed as a special case of application 
layer firewalls. The modest success of those 
technologies reflects the need for far more work on AI 
before they can make significant difference Computer 
World surveillance. 
But those examples show that AI has a natural 
role to play in Computer World surveillance. They also 
show that using AI is inherently difficult. Introducing tools 
whose reaction to attacks is not totally predictable as 
they involve some context dependent reasoning will 
force attackers to potentially change completely their 
strategy. The increasing role of AI is in the logic of the 
modernization of the web and the internet. Web 2.0, the 
semantic web, the use of first order logic, the 
development of OWL are as many evidences of that. 
These developments will raise the level of complexity of 
Computer World surveillance and force it to be much 
more sophisticated. Computer World surveillance may 
turn out to be one of the best areas of applications of AI. 
a) An Illustrative Example: Cross Site Request Forgery 
(CSRF) 
This paragraph is meant to make the following 
discussion a bit less "high level" or purely abstract, by 
providing an example around which the rest of the 
discussion can be organized. The example is Cross Site 
Request forgery (CSRF). CSRF is not new. In 1988 it was 
known as “confused deputy”. Dubbed a “sleeping 
giant”, it came to prominence (i.e. enter in the OWASP 
top ten list) in the last few years. In the same way that 
XSS covers a large spectrum of attacks or 
vulnerabilities, some of which justifies to be called "cross 
site scripting", CSRF has grown into an open ended 
class of attacks. What all these attacks seem to have in 
common is that they hijack some credentials from a user 
and use them for the advantage of the attackers. Of this 
large class of attacks, what follows applies only to a 
subclass: it is when the attack takes place within the 
browser of the user. In fact the following considerations 
would apply to all situations where the attacks take 
place within the browser of the user, such as the man in 
the browser. Would an expert monitoring each HTTP 
request be able in real time to realize that a CSRF attack 
is unfolding? 
Some context dependent analysis is of 
essence. The decision of whether malicious activity is 
taking place or not does not need to be the result of only 
one measurement. The analysis can be protracted and 
based on a succession of observations. An AI machine 
using a Bayesian algorithm could potentially do exactly 
the same. It is known that in a situation where the 
probability of false positive and negative of individual 
measurements is not so small, a shrewd Bayesian 
algorithm, well implemented can dramatically reduce the 
overall probability of false positive, while maintaining the 
probability of false negative low [16]. In other words, it is 
©  2012 Global Journals Inc.  (US)
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possible with a shrewd use of multi-observations to 
maintain the probability of mis-determinations very low 
[16]. 
If one takes the example of the CSRF attack 
described in the classic paper of Felten [17]. A user 
while in a trusted session with his bank goes to a 
malicious website and click to download an image. The 
HTML request is crafted in such a way that through the 
browser, the query ends going to the bank website and 
instead of downloading a picture gives instructions (like 
transferring money or creating a new account) to the 
bank on behalf of the victim user. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.1.1
 
:
 
General cyber attack
 
A security tool monitoring the steps would find 
suspicious to have to find an image at a bank using the 
trusted session. It would assign a reasonably small 
probability of false positive for that (which could have 
been determined statistically before). Parsing the 
request, it would notice that it carries an executable. 
This too would raise serious suspicion. Then it could 
figure in the executable corresponds to what the bank 
requests for financial transaction. The probability of 
those three occurrences happening within the same 
query is small enough to trigger an alert that has a very 
very small probability of being a false positive. At each 
step the probability of false positive will be small, but 
different.
 
The point is that the tool would have to be able 
to do those inferences. It should be somewhat 
intelligent. We now turn to the questions: How far is AI 
from being able to produce tools like that? And what can 
be done now to facilitate the development of such tools?
 
b)
 
A Very Brief Discussion of AI Methods
 
Although AI can be called a discipline, it is so 
organized around many different applications that it 
almost looks like a vast fragmented world. The example 
of CSRF points toward some form of probabilistic 
reasoning, as being a more natural approach to deal 
with that kind of situation than an approach requiring a 
lot of data for statistical learning for example.
 
When it comes to probabilistic learning, it 
seems difficult to avoid contact with Bayesianism. 
Bayesian reasoning is not without pitfalls, as Judea 
Pearl intimated in a recent presentation: " I turned 
Bayesian in 1971, as soon as I began reading Savage’s 
monograph The Foundations of Statistical Inference 
[18]. The arguments were unassailable: (i) It is plain silly 
to ignore what we know, (ii) It is natural and useful to 
cast what we know in the language of probabilities, and 
(iii) If our subjective probabilities are erroneous, their 
impact will get washed out in due time, as the number of 
observations increases. 
Thirty years later, I am still a devout Bayesian in 
the sense of (i), but I now doubt the wisdom of (ii) and I 
know that, in general, (iii) is false." But (iii) may be false 
for humans, but not necessarily for machines, because 
machines do not need to be prejudiced. Algorithms 
based on Bayesian updating work better with machines 
than humans.... An additional reason to use a Bayesian 
approach, is that as we saw in the previous paragraph, 
through Bayesian updating, it is possible to reduce the 
probability of false positive and negative. The decision 
of whether malicious activity is taking place or not does 
not need to be the result of only one measurement. It 
can be the result of analyzing a succession of steps. 
This vision of a system able to process fast a lot 
of information, maintaining the rate of false positive and 
false negative small, despite the fact that the individual 
components themselves can have a high rate of false 
positive or false negative is reminiscent of the original 
idea of von Neumann discussed in his 1956 paper 
entitled: "Probabilistic logics and the synthesis of reliable 
organisms from unreliable components" [19]. 
As can be seen in the CSRF example, this 
probabilistic reasoning supposes the ability of some 
autonomous context dependent decision capability, i.e. 
needs some form of model of the environment. In the 
words of Judea Pearl [25]: "An intelligent system 
attempting to build a workable model of its environment 
cannot rely exclusively on pre-programmed causal 
knowledge”, but must be able to interpret autonomously 
direct observations. This is where AI differs from more 
traditional approach to security, which tends to be 
based on rules. But it is also where the use of AI looks 
more challenging. 
The amount of knowledge virtually present is 
very much greater than the amount of knowledge 
explicitly present. The extra knowledge is the result of 
query-time inference, which can require a lot of 
computation. And yet, we humans routinely perform this 
kind of inference quickly and in a way that seems almost 
effortless." One problem is to access this "virtual 
knowledge". 
We humans also have a remarkable ability that 
is central to all recognition tasks: we begin with a set of 
observed features, a set of expectations, and a vast 
collection of stored descriptions; the problem is to find 
the stored description that best matches these features 
and expectations. This is a computationally demanding 
task that we humans do frequently, quickly, and with no 
sense of mental effort," but far more challenging for 
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machines. This is where the AI formidable challenge of 
identifying algorithms and world representation enters. 
The attraction of Knowledge Based systems 
(KBS) [21] is their ability to make context dependent 
inferences. KBS tends to be specialized. Knowledge 
(virtual or real) is acquired or introduced in a variety of 
ways. But a lot rides on the way knowledge is stored 
and represented. 
Those systems can reason and make 
inferences. Although they have been developed with 
different applications in mind, in principle they could be 
able to make autonomous
 
determination of whether a 
malicious attack is unfolding.
 
Computer World surveillance may in fact be an 
area very appropriate for the application of
 
constructs 
like the KBS Scone (developed at CMU by Scott 
Fahlman [22]). Like other KBS, Scone provides support 
for representing symbolic knowledge about the world: 
general common-sense knowledge or knowledge about 
some specific application domain. But Scone is 
designed to be used as a component in a wide range of 
software applications. Therefore, a primary emphasis 
has been put on Scone's expressiveness, ease of use, 
scalability, and on the efficiency of the most commonly 
used operations for search and inference. A feature of 
Scone, which makes it attractive in the context of 
Computer World surveillance tools is that unlike other 
KBS (such as Cyc [23], Owl [24], for example, and most 
Description Logic systems), the emphasis is on the 
ability to do a lot of simple inference very quickly, not the 
ability to prove deep theorems or to solve complex logic 
puzzles. In
 
the system of trade-offs that underlie the 
development of KBS’s, the priority was put on 
“expressiveness” and “scalability”. At this stage, it is far 
too premature to exclude or recommend any approach.
 
c)
 
What AI Could Bring to Computer World surveillance
 
CSRF is meant only as an example. It is only 
one in an already large and increasing number of web-
applications vulnerabilities. Many popular websites are 
known to have exploitable cross-site scripting (XSS) [2] 
or cross site request forgery (CSRF, [24], [1]), 
“ClickJacking” vulnerabilities[4].
 
Most existing defenses against CSRF are ad 
hoc. Since CSRF involves in general hijacking a trusted 
session between a user and a website, a natural 
approach is to make such hijacking more difficult. One 
possibility is to
 
not rely excessively on cookies to build 
trust, but add additional identifiers, at the cost of making 
trusted sessions more burdensome. A minor 
consideration in the security community, but the 
cumulative effect of making every "critical" interaction 
cumbersome is to project the impression that the logic 
of the culture of security is just the opposite of the logic 
of the technological innovations taking place in the 
internet and the web.
 
Since users for their security should not have to 
rely on website designers to anticipate all forms of 
attacks, tools protecting directly the users are 
intrinsically more attractive. The user side proposals 
tend to be based on rules tailored for each known 
scenario of attack. An example is to treat HTTP POST 
requests as more dangerous, because they are the one 
that changes the state of the server and forbid them in 
some circumstances. In addition to interfere with some 
useful functionality, this is not sufficient since it is 
possible (using Java script code injection) to make GET 
requests accomplish the same thing as POST requests. 
Disallowing or limiting the use of Java script has been 
suggested. This makes sense in some specific cases, 
but that kind of approach is an exacerbated version of 
security standing on the way of
 
functionalities.
 
The commercial tool Request Rodeo is a 
commercial tool, which precludes scenarios on the 
basis of rules, that could lead to CSRF attacks. Its rules 
are so strict that it precludes proper interactions with a 
large number of  modern websites. Relaxing the rules on 
the other hand would reduce the degree of protection, 
demonstrating if need be that an ideal tool would have 
to be more intelligent than simply applying rules.
 
Web application security generates a very new 
type of challenges compared with the world of worms, 
buffer overflows, etc.. The two worlds overlap, but they 
call for very different kinds of security tools. In fact there 
is no good security tool or even paradigm yet for web 
application. From the perspective of Computer World 
surveillance, the world of web applications is very 
complicated as it seems to offer an infinite numbers of 
opportunities for abuse.
 
Some exploitable vulnerabilities are difficult to 
understand or anticipate as they result from technical 
details of protocols, implementation of application or are 
consequences of abusing functionalities which 
otherwise are very useful or valuable. This is at a time 
where web applications are proliferating fast and playing 
an increasingly central role in many critical operations
performed in the internet. Some exploitable 
vulnerabilities are difficult to understand or anticipate as 
they result from technical details of protocols, 
implementation of application or are consequences of 
abusing functionalities which otherwise are very
 
useful 
or valuable. Most of web application vulnerabilities 
stems from what makes HTTP, HTML, Java-Script and 
the like so efficient to support web activity. The 
controversy around the “same origin policy” illustrates 
the complication of web application security. All this to 
show that web application security calls for intelligent 
tools.
Approaches to defense
 
deliberately relying on 
AI may not deliver quick results. But they offer the 
perspective of a future very different and far more 
attractive than what the present approach based on 
"tweaking the plumbing" offers. In the same way that the 
co-evolution of pathogens and defenses from biological 
©  2012 Global Journals Inc.  (US)
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organisms has led to the emergence of the immune 
system, and AI-based approach to cyberdefense can be 
seen as the natural next step. 
To the legitimate concern that AI-based tools 
may be very large and suck a lot of CPUs (the immune 
system has as many cells as the nervous system: it is a 
huge organ), one can point to the fact that there is not 
much alternative. One immediate predictable benefit of 
approaching Computer World surveillance from and AI 
point of view will be to raise the level of the debate. 
Instead of being lost in the details of the implementation 
of old ideas, it will be forward looking. 
On the other hand, it has to be recognized also 
that letting security be the organizing principle of 
modernization of the internet, will have a stifling effect on 
innovations, i.e. one of the main reasons of the success 
of the internet. But if innovation and Computer World 
surveillance begin to use the common perspective of AI, 
both at the same time rely increasingly on AI, the logic of 
the interaction will be dramatically different.
 
Figure
 
2.3.1 :
 
How stuxnet Spreads
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